After a long lull relations between Turkey and Russia are finally being developed further on an official level. For that purpose Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul has paid an official visit to Moscow from Feb. 23 to Feb. 26. President Vladimir Putin along with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and some other members of the Russian government received him. In a statement he issued prior to the visit Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Aleksander Yakovenko had stressed that in Moscow Gul would be met “not as a rival but as the minister of a country with which Russia has common interests and goals”.

Gul was accompanied by a large delegation consisting mostly of businessmen and that was unusual for a visiting foreign minister. Taking into consideration the momentum Turkish-Russian relations are gaining the Turkish side has made an exception in this case, treating this occasion as a “prime ministerial visit” in an unprecedented manner. In Moscow Gul not only discussed bilateral political and diplomatic relations in his capacity as foreign minister but he also tackled economic issues during the talks held between the Turkish and Russian delegations as a prime minister would. The visit gave the Turkish side a chance to put on the agenda the bilateral trade deficit and seek an improvement by way of increasing the Turkish exports to Russia. The Turkish side also sought Russian support on the Cyprus issue, Russia being a permanent member of the UN Security Council and has been displaying greater sympathy for Turkey’s views on this issue than in the past. Russia, meanwhile, put on the agenda primarily the weapons purchases and the helicopter tender. The Russian side dwelt also on issues related to energy and, in this context, the sale of electricity to Turkey. The two sides announced that they had “similar” views on Iraq. In the realm of political relations the Chechnya issue undoubtedly put its mark on all the talks held in Moscow.

Today the Chechnya issue constitutes a “psychological barrier” in Turkey-Russia relations, a barrier that must definitely be overcome.  Chechnya, probably the only issue on which Putin –who took office at a time Russia was on the brink of fragmentation and has managed to turn it into a country that has a say in international affairs-- has failed, has great significance for Russia and for the Kremlin team. For that reason Russia perceives as a “natural threat” any country it believes to be involved in this issue directly or indirectly.  In the past there had been certain incidents such as the raid on the Avrasya ferryboat. More recently a number of people carrying Turkish passports were killed in clashes in Chechnya. These incidents have turned Chechnya into an all the more sensitive issue in Turkish-Russian relations. Due to the fact that some Turkish citizens –believed to be a few million-- have Caucasian origins the Turkish public becomes sensitized to the Chechnya issue from time to time. That sensitivity causes certain troubles in Turkish-Russian relations.

Meanwhile, there is in Russia a powerful Armenian lobby of nearly two million people and these circles want to use that factor to put pressure on the Russian public.  The Russian press hardly desires Turkey-Russia relations to develop; and certain “ethnic” lobbies that exert an influence on the Russian press strive to link the Chechnya issue to Turkey. This makes it even harder to overcome the Russian public’s prejudices against Turkey. Yet, in the wake of the visit then Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit paid to Moscow in 1999, highly significant steps were taken. For example limits were imposed on the activities of a number of nongovernmental organizations that had been collecting aid for Chechnya. They were banned from collecting aid and their bank accounts were frozen. Similarly, the close cooperation Turkey and Russia entered into in the fight against terrorism in the framework of the “Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia” signed by the foreign ministers of Turkey and Russia in the aftermath of Sept. 11, has, in practice, curtailed to a great extent the activities concerning Chechnya of certain circles in Turkey. Initially Russia had misgivings about the Erdogan government because of the nature of its political views. Later, the rational steps the Erdogan government has taken, the efforts Turkey has made to develop its relations with Russia together with the relations with the West, have eased those worries significantly. However, the mutual “perception problem” has not yet been fully overcome.

Many difficulties prevent the two sides from overcoming that problem. First and foremost is obviously Turkey’s problem of “explaining its case”. When one looks at the general progress of the Turkish-Russian relations one sees that almost all of our high-ranking officials that visit Russia limit their talks to the “economic relations” issue. Their activities in Moscow are limited to conducting bilateral talks and to attending the inauguration ceremonies of a number of business premises belonging to Turkish businessmen. Yet, it would be equally important for them to contact --as they do during their visits to the USA-- the intellectual circles in Russia, to give lectures at a university or a center for strategic studies. For that reason the Turkish and Russian intellectuals remain “disconnected” and each time such a visit takes place Turkey fails to make use of the chance to explain its views directly to the Russian intellectuals. Under the circumstances, Turkey finds it difficult to explain to the Russian elite and to the Russian public in general the measures it has taken on the Chechnya issue. As long as this difficulty is not overcome Turkey’s economic and strategic cooperation with Russia will not attain the desired dimensions, that is, the two sides will not be able to tap adequately the great potential they have for cooperation. The two sides must overcome this perception problem with priority. In this respect Putin’s long-awaited trip to Turkey will be very important. With this trip the “Russian alternative” that has started gaining a place on Turkey’s agenda lately, may come to be considered more seriously.

While Abdullah Gul’s visit to Moscow was continuing successfully a government crisis overshadowed the visit all of a sudden. Following his meeting with Gul on Feb. 24 President Putin announced unexpectedly that he has dismissed the Russian government. During a program broadcast live on state TV channels, ORT and RTR, he announced that he has dismissed the Kasyanov government by invoking his constitutional powers. He said that the reason was definitely not any lack of success on the part of the government. He stressed that on the contrary he was highly satisfied with the government performance. He explained his move by saying, “In the March 14, 2004 election our people should be able to know with whom I would be working in the forthcoming period.” In the aftermath of the dismissal that Putin sees as part of the public administration reform under way in Russia, Putin appointed Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristiyenko prime minister on an interim basis. Putin pointed out that he would form the new government by the election date so that the Russian people would know prior to the election the team that would govern them. Thus, for the first time in Russian history a government has been dismissed not because it performed poorly –or, as in several cases in the past because of an economic crisis—but because of the president’s desire to create a new team prior to an election.

The official reason for the dismissal of the government was disclosed in the aforementioned manner “from the horse’s mouth”. However, one tends to think that there is more to this issue “behind the screens”, factors that go well beyond the “ensuring an honest election campaign” rationale. This is because Putin does not even have a serious rival in this election. It is almost certain that he will win the election with a wide margin. So, this is --rather than an election maneuver-- a move that has its roots in the tug-of-war that has taken place in Kremlin between the security people (Siloviks) and the liberals in the post-Yeltsin period. It should be remembered that Kasyanov was the only member of government that opposed the “oligarchs” operation the Kremlin team led by Putin persistently conducted. Kasyanov was known as the sole remaining liberal in the administration after Aleksander Voloshin resigned as the director of the presidential office after the arrest of Yukos chairman Mikhail Khodorovsky, a Russian “oligarch”. Though Putin has dismissed the entire government obviously Kasyanov was the real target. Some of the ministers heard the news of their dismissal from members of the press and the timing of the dismissals was significant. Kasyanov, who could have played a “unifying” role for the opposition groups that are finding it difficult to nominate a specific candidate to challenge Putin, was dismissed as prime minister after the legal period for applications for presidential candidacy expired. So he will not be able to run for president. Kasyanov was one of the few high-level officials in the Putin administration that are not “Petersburgers”. He was appointed prime minister by Putin in 2000 in line with the recommendation made by the members of the “Family” that was still influential in Kremlin at that time. With Kasyanov’s departure the last remaining traces of the Yeltsin era will have been erased completely during Putin’s second term in office and the group called Kremlin’s “security men” will be fully in power.