MOSCOW - As further prospects for regime change become apparent in Central Asia, long-serving leaders in that region appear to be leaning toward Moscow and Beijing - and away from Washington - in an apparent attempt to stave off another Ukraine-style revolution.
Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev increasingly faces what is already being described as a 'Tulip Revolution', a reference to the country's wide variety of tulip species. Hence from Sunday to Tuesday, Akayev paid a visit to Russia, presumably seeking reassurances that the Kremlin was still behind him.
In a public address in Moscow on his arrival, Akayev stressed the need to work out 'preventive measures' to combat international terrorism. Meanwhile, at a meeting in Moscow, President Vladimir Putin and Akayev discussed interaction in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Keeping in mind the ongoing geostrategic power play in the region, Akayev played on Moscow's own insecurities, and described the Russian military base in Kant as 'a key element of security in Central Asia'. In other words, the Russian base in Kant and Central Asian security would be safe as long as old elites remain in power in Kyrgyzstan.
Akayev, now 60 years old, had promised to leave office this coming October, at the end of his third term. He is barred by the constitution from running again, but in the past he has circumvented the law to extend his power. Therefore elections held since Kyrgyzstan's independence in 1991 have never been recognized as free and fair.
The president's daughter, Bermet Akayev, recently helped to organize a new party of power, Alga Kyrgyzstan, or 'Forward Kyrgyzstan', which is expected to run in next month's parliamentary election. Pro-Akayev political groups aim at a strong showing to boost their candidate in the October 30 presidential poll.
Pro-Akayev political forces now face ominous signs. On December 20, leaders of opposition groups threatened to stage massive demonstrations against what they described as attempts to rig the February parliamentary vote. Beginning January 7, about 150 people, wearing yellow and pink protest scarves, picketed outside parliament, and later government buildings in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek. They were protesting the authorities' refusal to change the electoral law to allow citizens who have not lived in the country for five years before the election date to register as candidates. The decision in effect ended the political aspirations of four former ambassadors, and last Wednesday about 400 people gathered in Bishkek to protest the Supreme Court ruling that upheld the decision.
Kyrgyzstan has been experiencing a measure of stability and relative prosperity, notably in comparison to nearby Afghanistan and Tajikistan. However, more than 40% of the country's 5 million inhabitants live below the national poverty line, according to United Nations Development Program figures. Therefore, opposition leaders have reasons to count on mass support from disillusioned people.
As Akayev announced his intention last year not to seek another term, several of his loyalists, including former prime minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev, former head of the Security Council Misir Ashirkulov and former foreign minister Muratbek Imanliyev, joined the opposition.
Other Central Asian leaders recognize that prospects of regime change are becoming far too obvious. The danger of another coup is apparent in Kyrgyzstan now, Uzbek President Islam Karimov argued this month.
'Akayev identified the West as the source of money used to cover the 'shortage of democracy'. I ask him: If what you are saying is so indeed, why are you not doing something about it? He says he is helpless,' Karimov told the Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta daily on January 14. However, the Uzbek strongman reiterated that 'what happened in Georgia and Ukraine cannot happen in Uzbekistan', in reference to pro-Western leaders receiving 'help' in coming to power there.
Akayev may have the right idea in moving closer to Russia, which is understood to be keen on forestalling a political crisis in Kyrgyzstan. Russia and Kyrgyzstan have maintained close political and military ties, and Akayev tends to support the Kremlin's policies in the region.
In October 2003, Russia launched an air base at a military airfield in Kant, about 20 kilometers east of Bishkek. The Russian task force is to provide air power for a contingent of ground forces known as a rapid-reaction force. This group could eventually total more than 5,000 troops from Russia, as well as from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Moscow has been keen to reiterate its long-term interests in Central Asia without alienating Washington. On January 14, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov pledged peaceful co-existence between the US and the Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan. 'The distance between the US and the Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan is 30km and they co-exist peacefully,' he said. However, Ivanov insisted that Washington's base in Manas had been created 'temporarily', while the Russian base was permanent.
Meanwhile, the US believes that the presence of coalition forces at the airbase in Kyrgyzstan is 'still essential', US Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Stephen Young announced on December 25. Incidentally, on January 17, President Akayev visited a US-led coalition base near Bishkek for the first time since it was set up in this ex-Soviet republic in 2001.
Furthermore, Washington has tried to pressure Akayev into holding free and fair elections, which Bishkek has viewed as unwanted interference and support for the political opposition. In November, US Ambassador Young offered financial aid for fair elections and stated that 'if a peaceful transfer of power takes place in Kyrgyzstan, it could inspire the citizens of the neighboring Central Asian states'. Young's remarks set off a critical reaction among Kyrgyzstan's ruling elite.
On December 27, Akayev accused the West of sponsoring revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia and vowed to prevent similar scenarios in Kyrgyzstan. Speaking at a December 10 Bishkek conference on democracy, Akayev stressed that a revolution would not contradict the 'core interests of Kyrgyzstan'.
Kyrgyz official rhetoric took on some hardline overtones. On January 4, the Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan criticized Young for interference in Kyrgyz internal affairs. Law-enforcement agencies in Kyrgyzstan must prevent the nation's destabilization, first deputy head of the Kyrgyz presidential administration Bolot Dzhanuzakov told an Interior Ministry seminar on January 17.
'January protests by the opposition show that certain political forces do not want to comply with current laws. Their goal is destabilization at any cost and usurpation of power,' Dzhanuzakov said.
Akayev is believed to pursue a 'multidirectional' policy, favoring security cooperation with Washington as well as with Moscow and the Beijing-dominated SCO. He saw no contradiction in the simultaneous presence of US and Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, pledging his country to become 'a location for cooperation' between of Russia and the US.
Yet after perceived US involvement in the would-be Tulip Revolution, Bishkek's foreign policy seems to have shifted in favor of Moscow and Beijing.
In the meantime, Beijing is interested in boosting its own economic clout in Central Asia. In 2004, China's trade with Kyrgyzstan was up by nearly 85%. In September, China and Kyrgyzstan signed agreements for cooperation in large-scale joint economic ventures, communications, border trade and energy.
Moreover, Akayev's current vulnerability has been somewhat connected with his China diplomacy. In 2002, the Akayev administration faced criticism over a border deal under which Kyrgyzstan transferred some 95,000 hectares of its territory to China. In March 2002, 5,000 people gathered in the Jalal-Abad province of impoverished southern Kyrgyzstan, and in the ensuing rioting five protesters were killed and dozens of civilians and police injured. Therefore, anti-Akayev protests could also take on anti-Chinese overtones.
China's regional policy has a security element, too. In August 2003, armed forces of SCO member states, including China, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, held unprecedented multilateral counter-terrorism maneuvers near Ucharal, Kazakhstan, and Yining in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Beijing surely would not like to see any 'Tulip Revolutions' taking place in neighboring Kyrgyzstan - which would send unwanted signals to China's own tense Xinjiang region.