Although the two subjects are clearly unrelated, when President Nicolas Sarkozy said, last spring in Bucharest, that he wanted France to resume its full role in NATO, many suggested that this could give Ankara a trump card to exchange for a more favorable French stance toward Turkey’s EU bid. Recently, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan departing for the 45th Munich Security Conference, on February 8th, in response to a question on France’s return to NATO’s military structure, said that; “Turkey (was) still assessing France's planned return to the NATO alliance”.
This was taken by some, as a sign that Ankara might use its ‘veto’ in NATO if France persists in its stance of obstructing Turkish accession to the European Union. "Whether this decision needs to be put to a vote or not is still being evaluated in NATO. It’s more of a political matter than a legal one. Most of the NATO allies see this as a positive thing, but we are still evaluating it" Babacan added. This in turn further fueled speculations on whether this may really be a feasible political course that could be adopted by Turkey. For a cool-headed discussion, it’s better to position the debate in a proper context.
NATO-France relations
France is one of the founding members of the Atlantic Alliance. But, Charles de Gaulle, at the height of the Cold War, withdrew French forces from NATO in 1966, and expelled the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) from Paris in protest, mainly at U.S. hegemony in Europe, and what he perceived as a
special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.
Still, France remained a member of the alliance, and committed to the defence of Europe with its own forces stationed in Germany throughout the
Cold War and beyond. France rejoined NATO's Military Committee (the top
military planning –not decision making- body) in 1995, and since then has intensified working relations with the military structure. France, fielding troops in NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, has recently allowed a squadron of
Mirage 2000 fighter/attack aircraft to be moved to
Kandahar in order to reinforce the alliance's efforts. France did not, however, rejoin the integrated military (command and force) structure.
During the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, President Sarkozy announced reinforcement of French forces in eastern Afghanistan (in August 2008, sent an extra 800 soldiers in support of the Alliance in the Eastern part of the country, considered one of the most dangerous) and, declared his intention to lead France back into NATO's integrated military structure within a year, a step which could be implemented at the April 2009 Summit in Strasbourg (and in German town of Kehl, across the border).
Sarkozy’s move represents a complete reversal of 1966 decision, a revolution for its own sake. Its return to the military structure –and more importantly to the command structure, would be a historic move that would ease longstanding tensions over the so-called Euro-Atlantic defense cooperation. This would also lead to a parallel push for a strengthened European Union military wing as complementary to NATO, rather than a competitor or substitute. His logic for this move is easy to capture; first, NATO is a different alliance now, and secondly, today's threats are completely different. Since France has already been one of the main contributors to Alliance operations, it is only natural that the country is to be represented in the command structure. By becoming a full member of NATO again, France will indeed have a greater weight in major strategic decisions about the future of the Alliance.
The United States and France have already agreed in principle that France should man two top NATO posts in the event of its expected return. Under the agreement, French generals/flag officers would head NATO's regional command headquarters in Lisbon, and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, both four-star and, so-called US-qouta posts. Yet, such a change would certainly be subject to approval of other allies. Vice President Biden’s statements during the Munich Conference have been promising and supportive of French position and policy, further encouraging its return.
EU ‘front’
France is at the heart of the changes taking place in Europe, and has been instrumental in both preparation of the European Constitution and the so-called European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
The proposed European constitution, despite the pleas by the country's governing elite, was rejected in France (also in the Netherlands) in 2005. The margin of defeat was wide, and voter turnout was high. Widespread disenchantment over a variety of issues played a role in that result, not only in France but also in other European countries plagued by high unemployment and uncertainty over who should belong in the European club. There comes mainly (though not exclusively) Turkish membership into debate. Many French voters who opposed the constitution said that they were angry because they were not given a chance to vote on expansion from 15 to 25 (today 27) members, pulling in most of Eastern Europe, with the prospect of extending boundaries of Europe even further -to Muslim Turkey and impoverished Ukraine.
Sarkozy knows that France has never been able to rally other Europeans to the idea of a common European defense policy, out of a fear of antagonizing the United States, or weakening NATO. Now he aimes for a stronger involvement in EU defence policy, greater cooperation with the US and returning to NATO's military structure. Returning to NATO military structure, Sarkozy hopes to consolidate his own leadership role by boosting European ambitions on the world stage. What he expects from NATO (read Washington) in exchange for rejoining NATO is strong public support in favor of European defense cooperation.
2003 agreements between NATO and the EU -known as the Berlin Plus, have mainly solved the potential problems that might surface if EU wants to conduct crisis management operations, drawing on NATO assets.
EU- Turkish relations
Turkey in 1963 signed the
Ankara Agreement with the European Community, aiming to integrate Turkey into a customs union, acknowledging the
final goal of membership. In 1987, Turkey applied for formal membership, became part of the
customs union in 1995, and in 1999 the EU recognised Turkey as a candidate
on equal footing with other potential candidates.
The EU leaders agreed in December 2004 to start accession negotiations with Turkey, from October 2005. However, Turkey's accession talks have since been complicated by a number of problems. Several European countries such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands among others, have made their reluctance to allow Turkey into Europe clear. The issue of Cyprus continues to be a major obstacle to negotiations. With the EU freezing talks in 8 of the 35 key areas under negotiation, Cyprus (Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus, as recognized by Turkey) continues blocking the opening of new chapters with Turkey, accusing Turkey of harassing research ships - in its claimed exclusive economic zone, earmarked for oil and gas exploration, but challenged by Turkey on legal grounds. And President Sarkozy has come to power by making his clear stance against Turkish membership, before and during the presidential election campaign.
Meanwhile support for a potential EU membership has dropped in Turkey drastically, since the majority of the Turkish people believes that the EU does not consider Turkish bid on an equal footing any more, to the contrary, the country is discriminated against by the EU.
Turkey-France relations
In February 2003 NATO faced a crisis, when France (and Belgium) vetoed (by breaking the procedure of silent approval) a NATO decision concerning the timing of protective measures for Turkey in case of a possible war with
Iraq. Germany, also, did not break the silence procedure but said it supported the French veto. This happened before, also in 1990 when Turkey asked for the deployment of Allied Mobile Force Air Component (AMF-A), first time in Alliance history, to display Alliance solidarity and to deter possible Iraqi aggression, just before the Gulf War. Eventually, German, Italian and Belgium squadrons deployed reluctantly (Italians
less reluctant than others) and with delay.
In 2006, the French parliament voted, by a wide margin, to make it a criminal act to deny alleged ‘Armenian genocide’, further deepening Turkish suspicion of the European Union in general, of France in particular. Although the French government opposed the legislation as "unnecessary and untimely," President Chirac said Turkey must recognize the ‘genocide’ before it joins the EU, practically making it a ‘condition’.
France, is also arguing that the European Union should offer Turkey something short of a full EU membership, is openly opposing Turkey's membership, and is one of those EU members who blocked the opening of negotiation chapters directly related to accession.
Turkey supports France’s demand to return to the military wing of NATO
in principle, but awaits clarification on the ‘modalities’.
Ankara wants this decision to be taken with consensus, and as put by Minister Babacan, ‘prefers everything to be done in its procedural course’.
Than what?
France’s decision was warmly welcomed in the Alliance. NATO is not winning –as a matter of fact in serious trouble, in Afghanistan, politically and militarily. It is not an overstatement that the future of the Atlantic Alliance is now contingent upon success or failure in Afghanistan. Some allies are clearly reluctant to fight, and some are more than eager to leave as soon as possible. The high risk involved here, not only for NATO as a credible and viable alliance, but also for the world of ‘democratic’ nations, is obvious to any informed observor.
President Sarkozy’s decision, despite attacks from the opposition leaders who called him Bush's new ‘poodle’ and accused him of dragging France into an unwinable conflict created by ‘others’, is therefore crucial, both politically and militarily. Coming NATO summit in April in Strasbourg will mark the 60th anniversary of the Alliance, first time President Obama will participate in a NATO summit and this may be an ideal opportunity to welcome France back.
NATO diplomats are divided over the procedure that should follow. As argued by some, there may be no need for a consensus vote on the move if France decides to go ahead with it. France is already a member and "It is France's decision to decide politically whether it wants to take its full place in NATO's military structure" as stated by NATO spokesman. While some others say a vote should be conducted, Turkey awaits the clarification on the issue.
However based on previous practices and precedents, there should be no doubt that such a high level change would certainly require the approval (if only by silent procedure) by all members (not only by France and US), and Turkey would have the right to challenge and break the silence. However this is not a technical or procedural question, as rightly pointed out by Minister Babacan, it is a political decision. And if Turkey opts for opposing French return, such a veto may well leave Turkey alone. This was tried and worked in the past when Greece did not accept full participation of Turkish officers in NATO HQs located in Greece, because most of the allies were supportive of Turkey. But today the political –and military, realities are completely different. The return of France is politically supported by all members, it’s militarily needed, and Turkey has already declared her support ‘in principle’. Besides, Turkey’s differences with the EU go far beyond the French objection to her membership.
Once, in 1974, former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt told Prime Minister Ecevit that “You are playing your cards wrong”, when Ecevit, in a public statement intended for domestic consumption, hinted withdrawal from NATO, joining the Warshaw Pact. In the face of concrete realities which need to be taken as ‘givens’, what seems to be a trump card may well be mistakenly overvalued. Diplomacy (one of the two main tools of the Turkish foreign policy) takes –and should take- into consideration not only the written rules, but also –perhaps more importantly- the unwritten rules of the game.