Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, during an interview in Canada last week said that ‘one of NATO’s most important goals was fighting against terrorism’. Since ‘Turkey was a country that fights against terrorism’, NATO members should ‘replicate their cooperation in Afghanistan in other regions and lend their support to this fight’ he said. This call was naturally interpreted as “We rushed to Kabul, you should rush to Kandil” in an apparent reference to the Kandil Mountain in northern Iraq where the PKK elements are mainly based.

This article is intended to contribute to the already ongoing debate in and out of Turkey and put the facts and factors involved into a proper military-political context.

 

 

First of all, putting NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan and Turkey’s participation in this mission against a potential involvement of NATO in (Northern?) Iraq is against the very nature of being a member of a military alliance. Turkey, based on its political will, chose to contribute to alliance efforts in this country, not in return for a similar deployment somewhere else that would (singly) benefit Turkey, but in response to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions and in line with the North Atlantic Council decisions which Turkey also supported.

 

Secondly, the Alliance identified terrorism as one of the risks affecting the security of its members in its Strategic Concepts in 1991 and 1999. Later in 2002, the Allies endorsed the Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism. The United States, the European Union and the United Nations have included PKK in their lists of terrorist organizations since early 2000s. Therefore there is no ground for debate about how they see PKK –a terror group, officially. But, branding an organization ‘terrorist’ is one thing, taking action against it is completely another thing. Here a phenomenon that can be called ‘reciprocity’ comes into discussion.

 

The very same lists also include Hamas and Hizbullah –both openly supported by Iran, along with the Basque separatists ETA, Real IRA (RIRA) among others. It wouldn’t take much imagination to make a reasonable guess about several NATO member countries’ reaction if Spain or the United Kingdom for this matter, refuse to name Hamas as a ‘terrorist’ organization. There is reluctance on the part of many NATO members to assist Turkey especially after Prime Minister Erdogan’s statement that he did not consider Hamas a terrorist organization. Turkish governments under Erdogan’s leadership never shied away from openly displaying this unique understanding and behaving accordingly even before.But, again, words once spelled out by a prime minister make a major difference. They are taken seriously. Perhaps more importantly, people cannot possibly turn a deaf ear to them.

 

Thirdly, NATO Treaty which was drafted in the late 1940s does not require its members to go into action automatically. The domestic mood in the United States at the time of a growing international tension just after the bloody and long II World War was not conducive to an interventionist policy. The American public did not support an active role for the United States overseas. The result was a necessarily very vague treaty. The North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949 (Article 5) simply states that ‘the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all and they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force..’. The NAC established by Art 9 is ‘a Council, on which each (member) shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty’. Therefore, the occurrence of an armed attack does not necessarily mean that others would use armed force to assist; it says only ‘action deemed necessary’. This would require; (1) separate political decisions by each member and (2) a ‘unanimous’ decision by The North Atlantic Council (NAC) for ‘NATO’ action.

 

NATO member countries’ publics are simply not prepared to authorize their respective governments for a deployment to support Turkey’s fight against PKK. They were not too eager to support Turkey during the 1992/93 Gulf War or during the Iraq War in 2003, nor are they today. There are complex reasons for and motives behind this attitude, but Turkey’s recent association –as perceived by the ‘West’- with nondemocratic regimes and organizations which are considered ‘terrorist’ by the ‘West’ made the situation more problematic.

 

 

The foreign intervention in Afghanistan in September 2001 after the attacks on Twin Towers in New York started as essentially an American war. The war was mainly in the form of assistance to the Northern Alliance already fighting Taliban – and al-Qaeda. Following the fall of Kabul in November 2001 and retreat of the Taliban from most of northern Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by the United Nations Security Council in December 2001 and a government was formed to run the country. Initially ISAF command rotated among different nations on a 6-month basis. However, because of the difficulties in securing lead nations, NATO had to assume control of ISAF indefinitely in August 2003. This marked NATO's first deployment outside Europe or North America (traditional areas described in 1949 Treaty). But NATO had already forsaken the almost ‘sacred’ notion of ‘out-of-area’ in Bosnia as early as 1992.

 

The command and control within the ISAF chain of command is quite ambigious, it is essentially ‘American’. The overall command of the U.S.-led coalition effort in Afghanistan -known as Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan- has always reported to the United States Central Command and kept separate from the ISAF. The NATO structure reports through the NATO chain of command. Many ‘coalition’ units support Operation Enduring Freedom, ISAF and the Provisional Reconstruction Teams at the same time. The roles and responsibilities for legitimate governance, improved security and lasting socio-economic development have been mixed as with the national, ISAF and ‘coalition’ chains of command.

Many ISAF troop-contributing countries maintain caveats on their forces in the field. It is true that some shortfalls and such caveats hinder operational effectiveness. But there have been valid reasons. American way of conducting multinational operations –originally rooted and succesfully concealed in NATO procedures and command structure- have made various nations wary of direct American political and military control especially after the Somalia experience of early 1990s.

 

As ISAF expanded its area of operations to the south and to the east in 2006, it also assumed command of the US-led Coalition forces. With the transition of authority to ISAF, the responsibility for counter-terrorist operations, including pursuing al Qaeda along Afghanistan’s border region with Pakistan came also under ISAF. This responsibility includes also the training of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, mentoring the ministries of defense and interior, mentoring Afghan National Army corps and below and Afghan National Police districts and below. The transfer of authority from OEF to ISAF did not change coalition leadership realities. The United States remains dominant in the coalition structure. For example, the Combined Joint Task Force 82 which now commands NATO’s Regional Command East Sector is actually the headquarters of the American 82nd Airborne Division. The Intermediate Joint Command which runs the tactical battle is in reality an American national command and the forces fighting the Taliban in eastern and southern Afghanistan still remain under effective ‘coalition’ i.e. American control.. Since February 2007 ISAF Commanders have always been American generals. (Except for the ten days between the recent resignation of General McChrystal on 23 June and the assumption of command by General David Petraeus on July 4.) Besides, there are other U.S. forces (special operations, Rangers, Navy SEALs, air commandos, Marines, CIA teams etc.) which are under national control –not ISAF or NATO control.

 

Today there are troops from 46 NATO, partner and non-NATO/non-partner countries –such as Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. United States, United Kingdom and Canada bear the bulk of combat operations and have sustained substantial casualties. Switzerland and South Korea have withdrawn. Canada has announced that it will withdraw the bulk of its troops from Afghanistan in 2011. The United States has also announced that it will begin to end combat operations in Afghanistan beginning in mid July 2011. And the United Kingdom has announced a withdrawal by 2015. There is an increasing loss of heart in Afghanistan and publics are becoming more and more reluctant to contribute to ISAF efforts under American leadership. The Netherlands has announced that it will begin withdrawing its troops next month (August 2010). Afghan redeployment had caused a political crisis in the Netherlands in February; not only the coalition government collapsed, but leading Christian Democrats lost considerably in both local and general elections this year. Although this cannot be attributed to Afghan deployment only -even primarily, this may set a precedent for other European members of NATO and encourage them to follow. Poland is already talking about starting withdrawal in 2012. (Overall public perceptions of risks linked to political Islam and EU immigration policies have to be taken into consideration in this context.)

 

Turkey currently has 1,795 troops in Kabul and Wardak Province. It has undertaken substantial military and other responsibilities since 2002. However, once the third largest contingent within the ISAF, Turkey has never engaged in combat operations.

 

 

Turkey has been a member of the United Nations since 1945 and NATO since 1952. Turkish politicians are supposed to know what decision-making mechanisms like in respective organizations and to work through them rather than making statements to the media completely out of the blue.

 

The international environment and the so-called ‘scope conditions’ have completely changed. Somebody would better think about the meaning of ‘public diplomacy’ before making such statements –and avoid causing a mixture of bemusement, amusement and concern. Even the American people are reluctant to continue to pay for others’ problems in blood, money or in kind.  

 

American leadership, whether one likes it or not, has been a fact of life both in UN and in NATO. Commitment on the part of the leader comes with a price tag –mostly in the form having a ‘say’. Since the United States is already politically deeply involved in the ‘fight against terrorism’ in the region and in Turkey, one wonders what can possibly be expected –and tolerated, let alone requested, beyond the current scope.

 

International military interventions by their very nature are not military but ‘political’ interventions in the first place. Any such intervention would certainly have economic, administrative, security, legal and humanitarian aspects too –further stretching the boundary between domestic and international politics.

 

Above all, how one can expect such an involvement from NATO –let alone individual members- as the subject in question has become the most contentious basis upon which the domestic politics has already polarized. In a situation of ‘government against the rest of the country’ both individual nations and the Alliance would refrain from taking actions that may be interpreted as siding with one party –government, opposition parties or possibly the military.   

 

I doubt if the Turkish Prime Minister really meant such an international intervention, under practical American leadership –whatever the modalities are going to be, to solve a vital national problem which Turkey has failed even in getting under control. Onus is on the Prime Minister himself to explain what he really meant both to the Turkish people and to NATO member nations.

 

Problems of international relations are seldom as simple as they first seem to laymen. And this simple fact is often overlooked. That’s why states have diplomatic and military bureaucracies and armies of advisors. If only they were asked to do what they are for.